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The Application of Article 85 of the
Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community to Exclusive
Dealing Agreements
David M. Cohen*
One of the major purposes of the formation of the Common Market
was the elimination of tariffs and the attendant increase in competition
among the member states. These provisions should not be thwarted by
private agreements between citizens of these member states. Thus, article
85 of the treaty forming the Common Market is designed to prohibit such
agreements. After setting forth the basic provisions of article 85, Profes-
sor Cohen analyzes its provisions, particularly those of 85(1), in the light
of recent decisions of the Court of Justice. 1Vhile concluding that these
decisions represent sound thinking, the author does point out some pos-
sible problems: for example, the incorporation of a "rule of reason" into
article 85.
A MAJOR PORTION of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community' (or Common Market) is devoted to
provisions designed to eliminate tariffs and quantitative restrictions.
The drafters of the treaty anticipated that the elimination of these
barriers to trade between the
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themselves of the economies of scale. The drafters also realized
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provisions could be nullified by the operation of private agreements.
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1 CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 55 151-5455 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CMR].
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community will be also referred to
as either the treaty or the Treaty of Rome.
EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS
Consequently, articles 852 and 86' of the treaty seek to prevent
the creation of private agreements which threaten to re-establish
the trade barriers that had been erected by state action.
The Commission4 has devoted the major portion of its efforts
to implement article 85 to the consideration of exclusive agreements
and has recently issued a proposed group exemption5 which serves
as a guide to the Commission's interpretation of the third paragraph
of article 85. Moreover, three recent decisions of the Court of
Justice8 are specifically concerned with the interpretation and appli-
cation of article 85 to this type of agreement.7 It would appear
appropriate, therefore, to examine in detail these actions of the
Commission and these decisions of the Court of Justice.
This study is divided into three major sections. The first section
sets forth the relevant provisions of the treaty; the second section
is concerned with the interpretation and application of the first
paragraph of article 85;8 and the third section presents some tenta-
tive conclusions.
I. THE TREATY PROVISIONS
The first paragraph of article 85 prohibits, as incompatible with
the Common Market, all agreements between enterprises, all deci-
sions by associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices
2 1 CMR 55 2005, 2031, 2051 (1965).
3 1 CMR 5 2101 (1965).
4 The Commission is one of the institutions created by the treaty to see that its
functions are carried out. The treaty provisions for and procedures of the Commission
are outlined in 1 CMR 55 4472-544 (1965).
GAnnouncement Made Pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation No. 19/65 of March
2, 1965, on the Application of Article 85, paragraph 3, of the Treaty to Certain Groups
of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2 CMX. 5 9125 (Aug. 26, 1966) [hereinafter
dted as Proposed Group Exemption].
6 The Court of Justice is the judicial branch of the European Economic Community
[hereinafter cited as EEC]. The treaty provisions concerning it are found in 1 CMR
55 4600-872 (1965).
7 Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the EEC, 2 CMR
5 8048 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966); Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966);
Socit6 Technique Minibre v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR g 8047 (EEC Ct.
Justice June 30, 1966). See also Kleding-Vernoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v.
Robert Bosch GmbH, 2 CMX. 58003 (EEC Ct. Justice 1962).
8 This study does not purport to consider all of the problems involved in the inter-
pretation of article 85. Rather, the first paragraph of that article is dealt with in
depth, with other paragraphs mentioned only for purposes of clarity. It might be
pointed out that a complete study of article 85, in particular, of the third paragraph,
would add greatly to the length of this study. Thus, a detailed analysis of 85(3) has
been omitted at this time.
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which are liable to affect trade between Member States and which
are designed to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the
Common Market or which have this effect. This shall, in par-
ticular, include:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices
or of other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical
development or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertak-
ing equivalent engagements in commercial transactions,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the accept-
ance by the other party to the contract of additional obliga-
tions, which, by their nature or according to commercial us-
age, have no connection with the subject of such contract.'
Article 85, paragraph three provides that the first paragraph
of article 85 may be declared inapplicable to agreements, decisions,
or concerted practices which help
to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting profit and which... [do] not:
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which are
not indispensable to the achievement of the above objectives;
(b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect
of a substantial part of the goods concerned.10
The second paragraph of article 85 declares that all agreements,
decisions, and concerted practices which are prohibited by the first
paragraph and which cannot be exempted from the prohibition by
the third paragraph are "automatically" null and void.'
The other section of the treaty pertinent to this study, article
86, prohibits, to the extent that trade between member states is
affected, "any improper exploitation by one or more . . . [enter-
prisesi of a dominant position within the Common Market or within
a substantial part of it."' 2
9 1 CvER 5 2005 (1965).
10 1 CMR 5 2051 (1965).
11 1 CMR 5 2031 (1965). "Under Article 85, paragraph 2, only the parts of an
agreement that are prohibited are null and void; the entire agreement is void only if
these parts cannot be separated from the rest of the agreement." Etablissements Con-
sten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 6753
(EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966). See also Soci6t& Technique Mini~re v. Machinenbau
Ulm GmbH, 2 GMR 5 8047, at 7696 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966). See generally
Schwartz, The Common Market Antitrust Laws and American Business, 1965 U. ILL.
LF. 617, 640-42.
12 1 CMR 5 2101 (1965).
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II. TiE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 85 WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE
TO EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS
A. Agreements Between "Enterprises"
The term "enterprise," as it appears in the context of article 85
of the Treaty of Rome, has never been expressly defined by the
Commission or the Court of Justice. Some doubt exists, therefore,
as to whether agreements between parties in certain relationships,
such as a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, are
within the scope of article 85(1)."
The Advocate General' 4 in Government of the Republic of
Italy v. Council & Comm'tn of the EEC'5 offered this interpretation
of the term "enterprise": "[EInterprises, regardless of their legal
form or of their gainful purpose, are natural or legal persons that
take an active and independent part in the economy and thus do
not pursue purely private activities."' 6  As this definition includes
the requirement that an "enterprise" be a "natural or legal person,"
the definition would appear to be in general accord with the view
that the term "enterprise" requires a juridical entity capable of enter-
ing into contracts.' i.e., "a unit with legal capacity."'" If this
interpretation were adopted, article 85 (1) would not apply to
agreements, for example, between a corporation and its unincor-
porated branch organization. 9
The interpretation of the Advocate General did not consider
the question of whether a wholly owned subsidiary can ever be said
to take an independent role in the economy. However, a subsidiary
is a legal entity. Moreover, if a parent corporation desires to maxi-
mize profits, the proper method of managing a subsidiary involves
permitting the subsidiary to operate as if it were an independent
13 The doubt is primarily due to the existence under German law of the concept
of "Konzern," i.e., "economically affiliated Ebut legally independent] enterprises under
common management." OBnDORFER, GLEISS & HIRSCH, COMMON MARKE CARTEL
LAw 2-3 (1963).
14The Advocates General are assistants to the judges of the Court of Justice in
carrying out their judidal duties. EEC Treaty Art. 166, 1 CMR 5 4607 (1965).
15 2 CMR S 8048 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
16 Id. at 7727 (conclusions of the Advocate General).
17 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 627.
18 OBERDORFER, GLmSS & HIRSCH, op. cit. supra note 13, at 2.
19 Article 86 may, however, be applicable to an "abuse of a dominant position"
resulting from the action of a parent and its branch organization. 2 CMR 8048, at
7719; Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR g 8046, at 7651 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
corporation.2" It would seem only logical, then, that article 85(1)
should apply to agreements between a parent corporation and its
subsidiary if the latter is independently managed.
B. Types of Agreements Within the Scope of Article 85(1)
(1) Horizontal Versus Vertical Agreements.-Article 85(1)
prohibits agreements which are liable to affect trade between the
member states and which are "designed to prevent, restrict or dis-
tort competition . . . or which have this effect."'" The phrase
"prevent, restrict, or distort competition" is clarified by five exam-
ples of the type of change in market conditions which is to be con-
sidered a prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition." The
type of change indicated by each example can be viewed as that
which results from the conclusion of a horizontal agreement but not
from the conclusion of a vertical agreement. Therefore, the posi-
tion of the Commission23 that article 85 (1) applies to both vertical
and horizontal agreements has been the subject of dispute.24
The Court of Justice has decided, in accord with the views of
the Commission and the Advocate General,25 that article 85(1)
applies to both vertical and horizontal agreements.26  This conclu-
sion is premised upon the fact that article 85(1) makes no express
distinction between vertical and horizontal agreements and "one
cannot, in principle, make distinctions where the Treaty makes
20 See Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLtIM. L. REv. 401, 405 (1965).
21 1 CMR a 2005, at 1628 (1965).
22 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
2 3 Regulation 17 provides for the notification of all agreements including both
horizontal and vertical. Thus, it was apparent for some time that the Commission did
not doubt that article 85(1) prohibited both vertical and horizontal agreements. EEC
Council Reg. 17, art. 5, 1 CMR 5 2441 (1965).
Further indications of the opinion of the Commission on this question are given
by the decisions of the Commission on vertical agreements prior to the Grundig deci-
sion. For example, in Decision of the Comm'n on the Jallatte Agreements, 2 CMR 5
9083, at 8175 (EEC Comm'n 1965), as in several other decisions of the Commission,
the Commission did not discuss the issue of whether vertical agreements were pro-
hibited but merely assumed that this was the case. See also Etablissements Consten
& Grundig-Verhaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7688 (EEC
Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
24 Id. at 7624 (argument of the plaintiffs).
25 See cases cited note 7 supra.
26 "Agreement" means "contracts as generally understood in civil law." Govern-
ment of The Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8048, at
7727 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966) (conclusions of the Advocate General).
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none." 27  Moreover, if article 85(1) did not apply to vertical agree-
ments,
the parties could, through such an agreement, by preventing or
limiting the competition of third parties with respect to the prod-
ucts, attempt to establish or to ensure for themselves an unjustified
advantage to the detriment of the consumer or the user, which
would be contrary to the general objectives of Article 85.28
Therefore, article 85(1) applies to both vertical agreements between
parties that do not compete with each other and horizontal agree-
ments between parties in competition with one another.
An analysis of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome indicates
that the court reached the most desirable result. The prime objec-
tive of the treaty is to integrate the six national markets of the
member states into one common market by eliminating barriers,
represented by tariffs and quantitative restrictions, to trade between
the member states. This will have the beneficial effect of subject-
ing industries located in one member state, heretofore protected
from international competition by these barriers, to the stimulus of
the competition of industries located in other member states. The
increased competition of industries located in other member states
will stimulate the industries located in each member state to inno-
vate and reduce costs.
It is dear from the examples contained in article 85(1) that
the article is directed, at least in part, toward the prevention of pri-
vate agreements which are intended to eliminate (or which have
the effect of eliminating) the increase in competition made possible
by the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions or which are
intended to eliminate (or which have the effect of eliminating) the
benefits of this increased competition. For example, one of the
benefits of the increase in competition will be, presumably, an in-
crease in price competition. The examples contained in article
85(1) clearly indicate that a price-fixing agreement between parties
located in different member states and in competition with each
other (horizontal agreement) is prohibited by that article if the
agreement can be viewed as liable to affect trade between member
states. If parties located in different member states and in compe-
tition with each other were permitted to fix prices by agreement,
each party would be as effectively insulated from the price competi-
27 Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR 5 8046, at 7651 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
28 Ibid. Accord, Government of the Republic of Italy v. Coundil & Comm'n of
the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8048, at 7719 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
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don of the other as he would be if tariffs and quantitative restric-
dons had not been removed.
The same insulation from price competition can be accomplished
by means of a series of vertical resale price maintenance agreements
between a manufacturer and two or more dealers, each of which is
located in a different member state. If, therefore, article 85(1)
were to be interpreted as applying solely .to horizontal agreements,
the treaty provisions could not effectively prevent private agree-
ments from nullifying the benefits of the increased competition
made possible by the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions.
Thus, the Court of Justice exercised sound judgment in deciding
that article 85(1) applies to both horizontal and vertical agree-
ments.
(2) Exclusive Dealing Agreements.-A manufacturer may
choose from among a number of different methods of distribution,
including the utilization of an exclusive distributor and/or a branch
organization. The competitive effects of both means of distribution
are similar. Thus, if it is admitted that article 85 (1) does not apply
to distribution by means of a branch organization or a "non-indepen-
dent" subsidiary, it may then be argued that article 86 and not
article 85 (1) applies to exclusive distributorship agreements.29
However, the two methods of distribution are legally distin-
guishable,"0 and their competitive effects are not necessarily identi-
cal.3" For example, if the exclusive distributorship agreement pro-
hibits the distributor from distributing goods competitive with those
of the manufacturer, then the ability of other manufacturers to
locate distributors for their goods is to some extent limited. If dis-
tribution is effected by means of a wholly owned subsidiary or branch
organization (created by internal expansion rather than merger),
the ability of other manufacturers to locate distributors for their
products is either enhanced 2 or, at least, relatively unaffected.33
Upon the basis of arguments similar to the foregoing, -the Court
2 9 See the arguments of the Republic of Italy in id. at 7710. See also Etablisse-
ments Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR
8046, at 7625-26 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
30 Id. at 7651; Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the
EEC, 2 CMR 5 8048, at 7719 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
31 Ibid.
32 This would be the case if the parent operates to maximize profits by permitting
the subsidiary or branch to act as if it were an independent organization, i.e., if prof-
itable, to distribute the goods of other manufacturers.
33 This would be the case if the parent requires the subsidiary or branch to dis-
tribute only the goods of the parent. It should be noted that the same considerations
apply to interbrand competition as well.
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of Justice has decided that, if the other requirements are fulfilled,
article 85 (1) applies to exclusive distributorship agreements while
article 86 is applicable to an enterprise which distributes its goods
by means of a branch or, presumably, a wholly owned "non-inde-
pendent" subsidiary.34
The decision that article 85(1) and not article 86 is applicable
to exclusive distributorship agreements may stimulate a number of
vertical integrations. Article 85(1) is presumably applicable to a
variety of exclusive distributorship agreements. Unless an exclusive
distributorship agreement comes within the terms of the rather nar-
row proposed group exemption, 5 the parties to this type of agree-
ment will find it necessary to bear the burden of obtaining an
exemption pursuant to article 85(3) or of obtaining a "negative
clearance.""8  In contrast, article 86 applies only to an enterprise
which possesses a dominant position in the market. 7  A manu-
facturer might find it desirable, therefore, to integrate forward and
thereby greatly reduce or even eliminate (unless the firm possesses
a dominant position, article 86 does not apply at all) the possibility
of a violation of the treaty's antitrust laws.
C. "Designed To Prevent, Restrict or Distort Competition Within
the Common Market or Which Have This Effect" - A
"Rule of Reason"?
Section 1 of the Sherman Act35 prohibits "every" contract in
restraint of trade. The Supreme Court of the United States has
decided that section 1 is not to be interpreted literally, that is, not
every contract in restraint of trade is prohibited by this section 9 -
only those agreements which "unreasonably" restrain trade.40 An,
individual familiar with the judicial interpretation of section 1 of
84 See authorities cited note 30 supra.
3 5 Proposed Group Exemption, 2 CMR 5 9125 (Aug. 26, 1966).
3 0 Pursuant to EEC Council Reg. 17, art. 2, 1 CMR 5 2411 (1965), the Commission
may, "at the request of the enterprises.., concerned ... find that, according to infor-
mation it has obtained, there are, under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty, no
grounds for it to intervene with respect to an agreement, decision or practice." See
note 41 infra for a further discussion of article 85(3). See generally Schwartz, supra
note 11, at 636-37.
3 7 Article 86 applies only to the "abuse" of a dominant position. CMR 5 2101
(1965). It should be noted that the Court of Justice may interpret article 85 (1) to ap-
ply to mergers (as agreements which prevent, distort, or restrict competition).
38 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
39 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
40 Ibid.
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the Sherman Act is apt, therefore, to inquire whether article 85 (1)
is to be interpreted as prohibiting only agreements which "un-
reasonably" prevent, restrict, or distort competition or whether that
article is to be interpreted as prohibiting "any" agreement which
has the proscribed effect upon competition.
(1) The Application of Article 85.-Article 85 (1) prohibits,
as incompatible with the Common Market, "any" agreement, "any"
decision, and "any" concerted practice which results in the proscribed
effects or which possesses the proscribed "object." Article 85 (3)
provides that the provisions of article 85(1) may be declared inap-
plicable to the agreements, decisions, and practices prohibited by
article 85(1) if the agreements, decisions, or practices fulfill two
positive and two negative requirements.4' If article 85(1) is to be
41The two positive requirements are: the agreement must contribute to the im-
provement of the production or distribution of the goods; and consumers must be
allowed a fair share of the resulting profits. The two negative conditions are: the
restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of the positive objectives; and the
parties must not be enabled by the agreement to eliminate competition "in respect of
a substantial portion of the goods concerned." EEC Treaty art. 85(3), 1 CMk 5 2051
(1965).
Under the authority of EEC Treaty art. 87, 1 CMR 5 2201 (1965), the Council
has issued EEC Council Reg. 19, 1 CMR S 2717 (1965), which empowers the Com-
mission to exempt certain agreements as a group when the experience of the Commis-
sion indicates that the type of agreement involved is prohibited by article 85(1) but
fulfills the requirements of article 85(3).
The Commission has apparently decided to exercise the power granted by the
Council to exempt certain exclusive dealership agreements which do not: involve resale
price maintenance (Proposed Group Exemption art. 1, 2 CME 5 9125, at 8274 (Aug.
26, 1966)); impose a reexport prohibition upon the dealer (Id. art. 2(6), at 8275);
and which do not prohibit parallel imports (Id. art. 2(5), at 8275).
The Commission has apparently decided to exempt, as a group, those exclusive
agreements which do not contain the restrictions noted in the preceding paragraph
upon the basis of the following considerations. An exclusive agreement concluded
between a manufacturer located in one member state and a dealer located in another
member state which prevents the dealer from carrying goods competitive with the
contract goods improves distribution by aiding the manufacturer in an attempt to
"rationalize" production, by helping the manufacturer to overcome linguistic, cultural,
and legal differences between member states, and by stimulating the dealer to inten-
sively develop the market. Id. consideration (4), at 8273. Consumers are permitted to
share in these improvements in that: the operation of the agreement provides the con-
sumer with a wider choice and faster delivery; the existence of potential intrabrand
competition (made possible by the absence of a prohibition of parallel imports) and
the existence of interbrand competition ensures that the cost-savings resulting from
the improvements in distribution will be passed on to the consumer in the form of
lower prices; the intensive development of the market by the dealer may enable the
manufacturer to expand production and thereby possibly enable the manufacturer to
take advantage of economies of scale (again, the existence of potential intrabrand com-
petition and the assumed existence of interbrand competition will ensure that the cost-
savings made possible by economies of scale will be passed on to the consumer in the
form of lower prices). Id. consideration (5), at 8273-74. The restrictions of competi-
tion contained in this type of agreement are indispensable to the achievement of these
improvements if due to the state of the market and the position of the parties on that
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applied in conjunction with and in light of article 85(3), then arti-
cle 85(1) prohibits only "unreasonable" agreements, "unreasonable"
being defined in article 85(3). If article 85(1) is to be applied
separately and apart from article 85(3), then article 85(1) prohibits
"any" agreement, decision, or concerted practice which is intended
to restrain, prevent, or distort competition or which has that effect
and which is liable to affect trade between the member states. An
agreement, decision, or concerted practice would be exempted from
this prohibition only if, upon a separate investigation, the agree-
ment, decision, or concerted practice fulfills the requirements of
article 85(3).
In Etablissements consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Com-
mission of the EEC, the plaintiff Consten and the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany contended that "article 85
market, the distribution system could not be further improved. Id. consideration (6),
at 8274 (semble). Finally, the existence of potential intrabrand competition (made
possible by the absence of a prohibition of parallel imports) and the existence of inter-
brand competition will ensure that the parties will not be in a position to eliminate
competition for a substantial portion of the products concerned. Id. consideration
(7), at 8274.
The considerations utilized by the Commission as the basis for the Proposed Group
Exemption indicate that the Commission has had difficulty in reconciling the wide-
spread use of exclusive agreements with the requirements specifically set forth in artide
85(3). See generally Ladas, Exclusive Distribution Agreements and the Common
Market Antitrust Laws, 9 ANTRUST BULL. 761, 767 (1964). The benefits which the
Commission views as resulting from an exclusive agreement would appear to be of
minor importance. Moreover, the Commission's interpretation of "indispensability,"
as used in 85(3), as simply requiring a demonstration that the distribution system
could not be "further improved" would appear to be erroneous. With respect to the
past decisions of the Commission, see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 632-34. Finally, the
proposed group exemption, if ultimately adopted, would appear to offer little security to
parties which rely upon its provisions and therefore fail to notify the Commission of
their agreement. The applicability of the exemption is expressly dependent upon a de-
termination of the existence of adequate interbrand competition and upon a determina-
tion that there will be no impairment of the ability of other manufacturers to locate
distributors for their products. These determinations must be made by the parties to the
agreement before they may rely upon the group exemption. Only the passage of time
will indicate the number of individuals who are willing to rely upon their own judgment
in these matters in light of the scant information given by the Commission in its
past decisions.
In defense of the Commission on this final point, it should be noted that although
the proposed group exemption does not prevent the parties from notifying if they wish
to do so, Proposed Group Exemption consideration (3), CMR 5 9125, at 8273 (Aug.
26, 1966), the exemption specifically repeals the portion of a previous regulation which
permitted exclusive dealing agreements to be notified upon a simplified form. Id. con-
sideration (10), at 8274. It would therefore seem dear that the Commission does
not expect that a large number of exclusive agreements will be notified after the adoption
of the proposed group exemption. Therefore, it would appear that in the very vast
majority of cases, the Commission is willing to assume that vigorous interbrand com-
petition exists and that the ability of other manufacturers to locate distributors and
dealers will not be significantly impaired.
42 2 CMR 9 8046 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
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should be applied as a whole and with one stroke."4  The parties
based this contention upon the fact that, in their view, the excep-
tion contained in article 85(3) is too narrow and that it is too
difficult for a private party to assume the burden of proof under the
requirements of article 85(3). Accordingly, article 85(1) should
be applied in a "reasonable" manner,44 i.e., as a whole.
The Commission took the position that the "rule of reason"
approach developed by the American judiciary was not appropriate
to the interpretation of Community law." The "rule of reason"
was a necessary consequence of the fact that the American antitrust
statute did not contain any specific exceptions.4" In contrast, the
Community provisions which prohibit restraints of trade contain,
in article 85(3), specific provisions concerning exceptions.47 There-
fore, the Commission contended that the "rule of reason" approach
was not apposite to Community law, and articles 85(1) and 85(3)
must be applied separately.48
The Court of Justice apparently agrees with the Commission's
interpretation of article 85, for, when discussing regulation 19," it
stated:
The first paragraph of Article 85 sets forth a prohibition, its
second paragraph describes its effects, and its third paragraph
tempers these provisions by authorizing the granting of exemptions
from the prohibition .... The conditions under which an agree-
ment does not automatically fall under the prohibition of Article
85, paragraph 1, and those under which it can be granted an ex-
emption under Article 85, paragraph 3, are different.50
Thus, a "rule of reason" was not incorporated into article 85(1);
article 85 was to be applied as a whole. However, as will subse-
quently be noted, the Court of Justice appears to have adopted a
"rule of reason" in its interpretation of the phrase "prevent, restrict
or distort competition," as contained in article 85 (1).
43Id. at 7640.
441d. at 7641. The parties contended that a "reasonable" approach would require
the Commission, in applying article 85(1), to consider whether interbrand competition
was of such strength that the restriction could not be considered to have an "unreason-
able" effect on competition. Id. at 7639, 7652.
451d. at 7641.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. The Commission was therefore of the opinion that interbrand competition
would ouly be relevant in considering whether an exemption should be granted pur-
suant to article 85(3). Ibid.
49EEC Council Reg. 19, 1 CMR 5 2717 (1965).
50 Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the EEC, 2 CMR
5 8048, at 7718 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
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(2) The Interpretation of Article 85(1): Exclusive Dealing
Agreements.-
(a) The Commission.-In the Consten decision, the Com-
mission considered an agreement to be prohibited by article 85(1)
whenever it was determined that "the agreement not only theoreti-
cally but also perceptibly affects the freedom of action of the parties
or the position of third parties on the market."' This standard is
perhaps best understood by considering several of the decisions of
the Commission concerning exclusive distributorship agreements.
In Decision of the Comm'n on D.R.U.-Blondel Agreement,"
Decision of the Comm'n on Hummel-Isbecque Agreement,53 and
Decision of the Comm'n on Jallatte Agreements,54 the Commission
indicated that the fact that an exclusive distributorship agreement
between two firms, each of which is located in a different member
state, prevented the manufacturer from delivering the contract goods
directly to anyone but the exclusive dealer located within the con-
tract territory was sufficient, in and of itself, to cause the agreement
to result in at least a theoretical restriction, distortion, or preven-
tion of competition."
The products for which the exclusive distributorship is granted
generally possess some identifying characteristics which are usually
emphasized by the use of a trademark. If effective intrabrand
competition exists, customers will be in a position to compare the
prices for the same brand charged by different distributors or re-
tailers. Customers will therefore patronize the most efficient dis-
tributor or retailer, his price necessarily being the lowest. The oppor-
tunity given customers to compare prices and thus to patronize the
most efficient distributor or retailer will force all such merchants
to lower their costs and, consequently, lower their prices. If effec-
tive intrabrand competition is not present, the stimulus to lower
costs, and thus prices, is removed.
An exclusive distributorship agreement which prevents the man-
ufacturer from delivering the product directly to third parties lo-
cated within the contract territory greatly impairs intrabrand com-
petition. Third parties (parallel importers) located within the con-
tract territory must purchase the goods indirectly from parties located
512 CMR 9 8046, at 7640.
52 2 CMR 9 9049, at 8098 (EEC Coimm'n 1965).
53 2 CMR 9 9063, at 8137 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
54 2 CMR S 9083, at 8175 (EEC Comnm'n 1965).
55 2 CMR 9 9049, at 8098-99; 2 CMR 9 9063, at 8137-38; 2 CMR 5 9083, at 8176.
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outside of the contract territory. Since the parallel importer must
purchase the goods indirectly, the price he pays for the goods will
ordinarily include the middleman's cost and profit. Consequently,
the parallel importer will always incur costs greater than those in-
curred by the exclusive dealer who is in a position to purchase
directly from the manufacturer. Therefore, an exclusive distributor-
ship of this type impairs intrabrand competition."6
The interpretation of the requirement that the restriction, dis-
tortion, or prevention of competition be "perceptible" is more diffi-
cult. The Commission has expressly stated that the determination
of "perceptibility" does not involve quantitative factors.5" There-
fore, the requirement of perceptibility is not satisfied, for example,
by a determination that the parties do a substantial volume of
business. The only other indication of the meaning attributed to
this term by the Commission is the statement made by that author-
ity in its argument before the Court of Justice in the Consten55
case:
In this case the suit brought by the UNEF firm [complaint to
the Commission], the intervention of the Leissner firm [in the
suit brought by Grundig and Consten to annul the decision of the
Commission that the agreement between the two firms violated
article 85(1)], and the earlier conduct of Grundig and Consten
[the institution of legal proceedings against LTNEF 59  and
Leissner e° upon the basis that the latter had committed unfair acts
of competition by parallel importingl ... shows that the restric-
tion of competition resulting from the prohibited agreements was
perceptible.61
Apparently, therefore, the restriction of competition resulting from
an agreement between enterprises is "perceptible" if the agreement
is being implemented by the parties.
(b) The Advocates GeneraL.-Mr. Karl Roemer, one of
58 Where, as in Decision of the Commission on the Grundig-Consten Agreements,
1 CMR 9 2743 (EEC Comm'n 1962), the manufacturer imposes reexport prohibitions
on all of the exclusive dealers, the agreements are even more inimical to intrabrand
competition as parallel imports are made impossible.
57Soci6t6 Technique Mini6re v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR a 8047, at
7689 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966).
5sEtablissements Consten & Grundig Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR 5 8046 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
59 See Soci&6 Union Nationale des Economies Familiales v. Etablissements Con-
sten, 2 CMR 5 8009 (Ct. App. Paris 1963).
60 See the mention of this in Etablissements Consten & Grundig Verkaufs-GmbH
v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7621 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
61 Id. at 7640. See also Socit6 Technique Mini~re v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH,
2 CMR 5 8047, at 7701 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966).
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the Advocates General, contended that an agreement does not re-
strict competition within the meaning of article 85(1) unless the
agreement actually results in or is likely to result in a "significant"
impairment of competition." Here again, a determination of "sig-
nificance" should not be based solely upon the volume of business
done by the parties. Rather, under this view, the Commission must
compare the market situation as it exists after the conclusion of
the agreement with the market situation as it would have developed
in the absence of the agreement." For example, in considering
whether an exclusive distributorship agreement results in a signifi-
cant impairment of competition, the Commission should, under this
view, consider such questions as whether the manufacturer would
have been in a position to penetrate the contract territory without
an exclusive distributorship agreement and whether interbrand com-
petition is so vigorous that no intrabrand competition would have
occurred even in the absence of the agreement."
(c) The Court of Justice.-The Court of Justice has inter-
preted article 85(1) to require, in the first instance, an inquiry into
the purpose of an agreement. "  This inquiry is to be based upon
an analysis of the agreement itself in light of the economic context
within which the agreement is to be implemented and not upon
the subjective intent or motive of the parties.66 If the analysis of
the agreement
does not reveal a gufficient degree of injury to competition, then
the effects of the agreement must be examined. For the agree-
ment to be prohibited, the conditions establishing that competi-
tion has actually been either prevented or perceptibly restricted or
distorted must be present. The competition in question must be
02 Id. at 7702.
63 Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR 5 8046, at 7663-64 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966) (conclusions of the Ad-
vocate General).
64Ibid. In Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch
GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8003 (EEC Ct. Justice 1962), M. Lagrange, the other Advocate
General, agreed with the interpretation of the German government that article 85(1)
is violated where "a restraint of competition... causes the movement of goods to de-
viate from its normal and natural course.... For this reason, any influence or economic
movement, even though not substantial, constitutes . . . [a violation) of Article 85,
paragraph 1." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 7153 (conclusions of the Advocate General).
6 5 Soci&d6 Technique Minire v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR g 8047, at
7696 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966).
66 Ibid. If the purpose of the agreement is to restrain, prevent, or distort competi-
tion, it is not necessary to examine the effects. Etablissements Consten & Grundig-
Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7652-53 (EEC Ct.
Justice July 13, 1966).
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
understood as that which would actually exist without the agree-
ment in issue.67
Perhaps the opinion of the court can be clarified somewhat by
considering its approach to a specific type of agreement, viz., an
exclusive distributorship agreement:
An alteration of competition may be suspected where an agree-
ment appears to be necessary for an enterprise to penetrate a ter-
ritory in which it was not doing business. That is why, to decide
whether a contract containing a clause "granting an exclusive sell-
ing right" must be considered as prohibited because of its object
or because of its effect, it is necessary to take into account the fol-
lowing in particular: the nature of the products and whether or
not their quantity was limited, the position and importance of the
licensor and licensee on the market of the products concerned,
whether the contract is isolated or is one of a group of contracts,
and whether the clauses protecting the exclusiveness are rigid or
possibilities are left open for other channels of trade in the same
product through re-exports and parallel imports.68
Prior to the abolition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions by
the member states, many manufacturers confined their distribution
and sales efforts to national markets. As the barriers to trade be-
tween the member states were abolished, these manufacturers found
that it became increasingly feasible to distribute their products in
other markets. To take advantage of this situation, a manufacturer
could choose to establish his own distribution system in the new
market or to utilize a distributor previously established in that
market. It is clear from the portions of the opinion of the Court
quoted above that if the manufacturer chooses to distribute his
product in a new market by means of a distributor, an agreement
between the manufacturer and the distributor which grants the lat-
ter the exclusive right to distribute the product within a certain
territory is suspect and may come within the scope of article 85 (1).69
However, it would appear that an exclusive agreement is not pro-
hibited per se by article 85(1).
An exclusive agreement is prohibited by article 85(1) if, upon
an analysis of the agreement itself in light of the economic context
within which it is to be applied, the agreement can be said to prevent,
restrict, or distort competition.7" As noted previously,71 an exclu-
67 Soci&6 Technique Mini~re v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8047, at
7696 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966).
68 ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 See EEC Treaty art. 85(1), 1 CMR 5 2005 (1965).
71 Text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
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sive distributorship agreement may theoretically impair intrabrand
competition. However, the terms of the agreement, particularly
the "exclusive dealing" clause, must be interpreted in light of the
economic context within which it is to be implemented. If,
for example, the manufacturer possesses a relatively small portion
of the market or if the product is relatively new, there may be no
significant demand for the product within the contract territory at
the time the agreement is concluded. If there is no significant de-
mand for the product, it is likely that very few or no parallel im-
ports would occur in the absence of the agreement. Under these
circumstances, therefore, it may be that an analysis of the terms of
the agreement in view of the economic context may not indicate a
"sufficient" (whatever that may mean) degree of injury to compe-
tition. It would then become necessary to examine the actual effect
of the agreement in order to determine whether the agreement pre-
vents, restricts, or distorts competition.
The opinion of the Court of Justice appears to hold that an
agreement is not prohibited by article 85(1) by reason of its effect
unless the agreement actually prevents or "perceptibly" distorts com-
petition." If parallel imports would not occur in the absence of
the agreement, the agreement obviously does not prevent intrabrand
competition. Moreover, if there is no significant demand for the
product at the time the agreement is concluded, it would appear
that dealers (other than the proposed exclusive dealer) located
within the proposed contract territory would not desire to purchase
the goods directly from the manufacturer. If other dealers do not
desire to purchase the goods directly from the manufacturer, it is
likely that these dealers would not complain to the Commission
about the agreement. The parties would also not find it necessary
to institute legal proceedings against a parallel importer to prevent
parallel imports since no such imports would occur. In this case,
therefore, the exclusive agreement would not perceptibly distort
competition.73 It would thus appear that if, because of the manu-
facturer's position in the market or because of the nature of con-
sumer acceptance of the product there is no significant demand for
the product at the time the agreement is concluded, the agreement
72 Etablissements Consten & Gundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR S 8046 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
73 For a discussion of "perceptible," see text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
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is not, according to this interpretation of the opinion of the Court
of Justice, prohibited by article 85 (1)7
If the Consten opinion can, in fact, be interpreted as holding
that an exclusive agreement is not prohibited if parallel imports
would not have occurred in the absence of the agreement, the deci-
sion is desirable in terms of competitive theory. If there is no
significant demand for the manufacturer's product at the time of
the conclusion of the agreement and if the manufacturer lacks the
financial resources for internal expansion or forward vertical inte-
gration, it is likely that the manufacturer's product would not have
appeared on the market represented by the proposed contract terri-
tory in the absence of some agreement between the manufacturer
and a dealer established in the new market. The exclusive agree-
ment thus enables a new product to appear on the market which
would not have appeared in any other manner. The appearance of
this new product may have the beneficial effect of stimulating inter-
brand competition between the new product and products previously
established on the market.
However, the incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article
85(1) so as to permit an exclusive agreement in the circumstances
noted does not appear to be in accord with the apparent adoption
by the court of the view that article 85(1) is to be applied as if
that article were separate and distinct from article 85(3).7 The
types of factors that the court indicates should be taken into account
in determining whether an agreement is prohibited by article 85(1)
appear to be the very factors which the drafters of the treaty in-
tended to be considered, if at all, only in determining whether an
exemption should be granted pursuant to article 85(3).
A possible explanation for the apparent departure from the
express provisions of article 85 can be found in article 9 of regula-
tion 17.6' Article 9(1) of that regulation vests exclusive authority
in the Commission to grant an exemption pursuant to article 85(3).
Article 9(3) of regulation 17 permits the national authorities to
apply article 85(1) as long as the Commission has not begun a
proceeding 77 to determine whether or not the activities in question
74 Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR 5 8046 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
75 See text accompanying notes 38-50 supra.
7 6 EEC Council Reg. 17, art. 9, 1 CMR 5 2481 (1965).
77 For a discussion of the difficulties involved in a determination of whether or not
the Commission has "commenced a proceeding," see OBERDORFER, GLEISS & HIRScH,
COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW 136-39 (1963).
[Vol. 18: 826
1967] EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS
are entitled to a negative clearance' or constitute a violation of
article 85 or article 86 or are entitled to an exemption pursuant to
article 85 (3) of the treaty.79
While article 9(1) is binding upon the national courts, article
9(3) is, in all probability, not.80 Thus, there are three alterna-
tives available to a national court before which a proceeding is
pending involving an agreement to which article 85(1) might be
applicable. The first is to voluntarily suspend the proceedings until
the Commission has determined whether the agreement was pro-
hibited by article 85(1) and, if so, whether the agreement was
entitled to an exemption pursuant to article 85(3); and then after
that determination to adhere to the decision of the Commission on
these matters. Second, if a new question involving the interpreta-
tion of the treaty has arisen, refer the question to the Court of
Justice8' (which, however, could answer the question only in the
7s See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
70 It will be noted that under this procedure, the power of the national authorities
is virtually illusory. If a proceeding is brought before a national authority, the parties
to the agreement involved in the proceeding, realizing that the Commission is the only
authority competent to grant an exemption pursuant to article 85(3), may decide to
apply to the Commission for a negative clearance. Once the Commission initiates a
proceeding concerning this application, the national authority will be deprived of juris-
diction.
Prior to the incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article 85(1), it was likely
that the parties to an agreement would always notify the Commission once the agree-
nment became the subject of a proceeding before a national authority. However, the
incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article 85(1) may change this situation to some
extent. The national authority now possesses the ability to apply article 85(1) in a
"reasonable" manner. The parties to the agreement might now reason that the national
authority, in its application of article 85(1), will be more "reasonable" than the Com-
mission and may thus decide to permit the national authority to proceed to consider
the matter rather than to deprive the national authority of jurisdiction by setting the
Community machinery in motion.
This situation presents less of a danger to the Community than the situation con-
cerning the national courts noted subsequently in the text. See text accompanying note
80 infra. The parties to an agreement do not possess complete discretion with respect
to the initiation of a proceeding by the Commission. The Commission may institute
a proceeding ex officio, or a third party may transmit a complaint to the Commission
concerning the agreement. The initiation of a Commission proceeding ex officio or
upon the complaint of a third party will deprive the national authorities of jurisdiction.
See 1 CUR 5 2582 (1965).
80 See EEC Council Reg. 17, art. 9, 1 CMR S 2482.10 (1965).
81 Article 177 of the EEC Treaty provides, in part: '"Where any ... question [in-
volving the interpretation of the treaty]is raised before any court of law of one of the
Member States, the said court may, if it considers that a decision in the question is es-
sential to enable it to render judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon." EEC Treaty art. 177, 1 CmR 9 4655 (1965).
Article 177 further provides that if a question involving the interpretation of the
treaty arises before a court from which there is, as a matter of domestic law, no appeal,
that court must refer the question to the Court of Justice. Ibid.
If the relevant article has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice, it may
simply refer to the previous interpretation.
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abstract and which could not apply the interpretation to the specific
case)." The third alternative would be to apply article 85(1) to
the agreement.
Prior to the incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article
85(1), a national court which chose the third alternative had no
choice but to declare that the agreement was prohibited by article
85(1) even though, had the Commission considered the agreement,
it would have granted an exemption pursuant to article 85(3).
After the incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article 85 (1), a
national court which chooses the third alternative possesses more
flexibility. Although the national court may not grant an exemp-
tion pursuant to article 85(3) and although the national court must
apply article 85(1) as if that article were distinct from article 85(3),
the national courts may apply article 85(1) in a "reasonable" man-
ner ("reasonable" being defined by the Court of Justice). Thus,
the court may have been moved to incorporate a "rule of reason"
into article 85(1) in order to give the national courts some discre-
tion and thus avoid the charge that the Treaty of Rome reduced
the national courts to mere mechanical functionaries.
If the above reasoning did in fact serve as the basis for the
incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article 85 (1), several criti-
cisms may be noted. It is true that the procedures of article 177,83
requiring a national court of last resort to refer a question of inter-
pretation of the treaty to the Court of Justice, will prevent to a
certain extent a wide divergence between the decisions of the various
national courts. However, the Court of Justice may answer ques-
tions submitted to it by the national courts pursuant to this article
only in the abstract, and it may not apply the interpretation to the
specific case pending before the national court. Therefore, the
incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article 85(1) may result
Questions submitted under this article must involve a question of interpretation.
If the questions submitted do not dearly indicate an interpretive problem, the court
will "sift out" the relevant question of interpretation from the questions as formulated
by the national court. See Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert
Bosch GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8003 (EEC Ct. Justice 1962).
Whether an interpretation is actually necessary to decide the case before the national
court will not be decided by the Court of Justice. As far as the court is concerned,
the only relevant fact is that the question has been submitted to it. See N. V. Algemene
Transporten Expeditie Onderreming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Adminis-
tration, 2 CMR 5 8008 (EEC Ct. Justice 1963).
82 The application of the interpretation is a matter for the national court requesting
the interpretation and is not within the competence of the Court of Justice under article
177. Da Costa en Schaake N. V. v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, 2 CMR 5 8010
(EEC Ct. Justice 1963).
8a EEC Treaty art. 177, 1 CMR 5 4655 (1965). See note 81 supra.
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in providing considerable room for divergent "interpretations of
the interpretations" of the Court of Justice as the latter are applied
by the various national courts to specific factual circumstances.
The uniform application of Community law is thereby impaired.
The divergent applications of article 85(1) by different national
courts can be as much a detriment to the integration of the six
national markets into one common market as divergent corporate
or tax laws.
Moreover, "notification," the procedure whereby the parties to
an agreement request the Commission to grant an exemption pur-
suant to article 85(3), requires the disclosure in most cases of a
great deal of information." If the national courts may apply a
"rule of reason" in interpreting article 85(1), parties desiring to
keep their agreement secret may be encouraged not to notify the
Commission of the agreement. If the agreement is ever the sub-
ject of a proceeding in a national court, then there may be an oppor-
tunity to convince the court that, under the "rule of reason," the
agreement is not prohibited by article 85(1). This would be espe-
cially true if the national court before which the agreement would
most likely come possessed a reputation for being more "reason-
able" than other national courts. Thus, the parties would operate
in secret if and until the agreement comes before a national court
and still not lose the opportunity to escape the prohibition of article
85(1).
(3) The Significance of Interbrand Competition: Exclusive
Dealing Agreements.-The Commission has indicated that, in its
opinion, the restriction, distortion, or prevention of intrabrand com-
petition is sufficient, for the reasons noted previously, to cause an
agreement to come within the scope of article 85(1) 85 The Court
8 4 EEC Council Reg. 27, 1 CUR 55 2651-57 (1965), stipulated that EEC Council
Form B, 1 CMR 5 2691 (1965) was to be used for the notification of all agreements.
Regulation 17 has been criticized because "the regulation requires extensive presenta-
tion of economic data and justification without providing substantive criteria." Schwartz,
The Common Market Antitrust Laws and American Business, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 617,
637.
EEC Council Reg. 153, 1 CMR 5 2694 (1965), amended regulation 27 to provide
that EEC Council Form B1, 1 CMR 5 2692 (1965) may be used for the notification of
certain types of exclusive distributorship agreements. This form was much less detailed
than Form B. Since the Proposed Group Exemption applies to exactly the same type
of agreements as those which may be notified on Form Bi and since notification will
no longer be necessary for those agreements exempted by the Proposed Group Exemp-
tion, that portion of regulation 27 which was amended by regulation 153 will be re-
pealed. Proposed Group Exemption art. 7, 2 CMR 5 9125, at 8275 (Aug. 26, 1966).
85 See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra. Interbrand competition may be sig-
nificant in considering whether an exemption pursuant to article 85(3) should be
granted. See Decision of the Comm'n on D.R.U.-Blondel Agreement, 2 CMR 5
9049, at 8099 (EEC Comm'n 1965); Decision of the Comnm'n on Hummel-Isbecque
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of Justice has agreed with this position."
The Commission has, however, utilized the existence of vigor-
ous interbrand competition to support the issuance of a negative
clearance. For example, in Grosfillex Co.," the Commission
granted a negative clearance to an exclusive distributorship agree-
ment concluded between Grosfillex, a manufacturer located within
the Common Market, and Fillistorf, a Swiss firm, notwithstanding
the fact that, pursuant to the contract, Fillistorf was prevented
from reexporting the contract goods (or from exporting goods com-
petitive with the contract goods) to the Common Market. Accord-
ing to the Commission, the agreement did not restrict or distort
competition due, inter alia, to the existence of vigorous interbrand
competition.
8 8
The Grosfillex case was primarily concerned with the effect
upon firms located within the Common Market of an agreement
imposing a reexport prohibition upon an exclusive representative
located without the Common Market. Consider the position of a
French firm, X, which desires to compete in the sale of the goods
manufactured by Grosfillex with another French firm, Y. X would
not find it profitable to purchase the goods indirectly from Fillistorf.
This results from the fact that, before Fillistorf could deliver the
goods, the price would be increased by at least an amount equivalent
to Fillistorf's profit, if any, plus an amount equivalent to the com-
mon external tariff. The Commission considered the existence of
the common external tariff alone as sufficiently limiting the effec-
tiveness of intrabrand (or interbrand) competition created by the
possibility of reexportation (or exportation of similar goods) by Fil-
listorf to the Common Market to prevent the agreement itself from
restricting or distorting competition within the meaning of article
85(1). The existence of the common external tariff would prevent
Agreement, 2 CMR 5 9063, at 8138-39 (EEC Comm'n 1965); Decision of the Comm'n
on Jallatte Agreements, 2 CMR 5 9083, at 8176-78 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
86 Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR 5 8046, at 7653 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
87 1 CMR 5 2412.37 (EEC Comm'n 1964).
88 Ibid. See also S. A. Nicholas Freres, 1 CMR 2412.46 (EEC Comm'n 1964).
In this case Nicholas, a French firm, had acquired the assets of Vitapointe Laboratories
and transferred part of them to Vitapro, a British firm. Under the terms of the trans-
fer, Vitapro was prohibited from selling goods in the Common Market competitive
with those manufactured by Nicholas (with some exceptions) for a specified period
of years. The Commission granted a negative clearance due, in part, to the fact that
Nicholas was subject to vigorous interbrand competition within the Common Market.
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effective intrabrand competition even in the absence of the agree-
ment. 89
Under one set of circumstances, however, X would find it prof-
itable to purchase the goods from Fillistorf. If interbrand compe-
tition within the Common Market were relatively ineffective or,
what may amount to the same thing, if Grosfillex possessed some
degree of monopoly power in that area and was therefore offering
the goods at a price within that area which at least exceeded the
amount of the common external tariff plus Fillistorf's profit margin
plus possibly increased transportation costs, and if Grosfillex were
selling the goods at a much lower price to Filistorf, X might find
it profitable to purchase the goods indirectly from Fillistorf rather
than directly from Grosfillex. X would then be in a position to
offer the goods within the Common Market at a lower price than
that which Y charged, even though the latter purchased directly
from Grosfillex. The only situation in which intrabrand competi-
tion is significantly harmed, therefore, is one in which Grosfillex
possesses some degree of monopoly power (or where interbrand
competition is relatively weak) and is exercising the resulting free-
dom with respect to prices in the manner indicated.
In the Grosfillex case, the existence of vigorous interbrand com-
petition within the Common Market precluded the exercise by
Grosfillex of a great deal of pricing freedom." It would thus
appear that the two reasons noted by the Commission in Grosfillex,
i.e., the existence of the common external tariff and the existence
of vigorous interbrand competition, were, at least in part, cumula-
tive and not severable.?1
Now consider the position of a firm such as X in the situation
described in Decision of the Comm'n on D.R.U.-Blondel Agree-
ment,'2 Decision of the Comm'n on Hummel-Isbecque Agree-
ment," and Decision of the Comm'n on Jallatte Agreements."
X desires to purchase goods for which Y is the exclusive dealer in
order to compete with the latter. X cannot purchase the goods
directly from the manufacturer since the latter has agreed not to
89 1 CMR 5 2412.37, at 1686-87.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. See Fulda, The First Antitrust Decisions of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 65 COLUM. L Ri. 625 (1965), which considers the rea-
sons given by the Commission as separable.
92 2 CMR 9049, at 8098 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
98 2 CMR 5 9063, at 8137 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
4 2 CMR 5 9083, at 8175 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
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deliver the goods directly to anyone but Y within the contract
territory. X must then purchase the goods indirectly from a party
located without the contract territory. (Note that the situation was
aggravated in the Decision of the Comm'n on the Gruandig-Consten
Agreements" due to the fact that parties outside the contract terri-
tory were prohibited from selling to such firms as X by virtue of
the reexport prohibition imposed by Grundig.) This outside party
will add to the costs of the goods an amount at least sufficient to
cover handling costs plus an amount representing a profit. Even
if X's transportation costs are not significantly higher than Y's, the
other two factors will always cause the costs incurred by X to be
higher than those of Y, who purchases directly from the manu-
facturer. Unless X is significantly more efficient than Y, X will
never be in a position to lower his price to that charged by Y and
still make a profit. Therefore, intrabrand competition will never
be as effective as it is in the situation where the manufacturer will
deliver directly to anyone.
There is another situation, however, where some effective intra-
brand competition is theoretically possible even if X is no more
efficient than Y. If interbrand competition is relatively ineffective
within .the contract territory, as where the manufacturer possesses
some degree of monopoly power within that area and charges Y
a higher price which exceeds the cost of handling charges, the third
party's profit margin, and the amount equivalent to potential trans-
portation charges increases, and is also charging parties outside the
contract territory a much lower price, then X may find it profitable
to purchase the goods from a party located outside the contract
territory. The same result would occur if the price at which the
goods are sold to Y is identical to the price at which the goods are
sold to parties outside the contract territory and Y sells the goods
at a price which at least exceeds the cost of the goods, i.e., if the
interbrand competition faced by Y within the contract territory is
relatively ineffective or if Y possesses some degree of monopoly
power within that area and is exercising the resulting price freedom in
the manner indicated. In either of these two situations, therefore,
in contrast to the Grosfillex96 case, less harm is done to intrabrand
competition when the manufacturer or the exclusive dealer possesses
95 1 CMR 5 2743 (EEC Comm'n 1962).
96 Grosfillex Co., 1 CMR 5 2412.37 (EEC Comm'n 1964).
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monopoly power (or when interbrand competition is rather ineffec-
tual).97
D. "tLiable To Affect Trade Between the Member States"
Another requirement of article 85(1) is contained in the phrase
"'liable to affect trade between the Member States."98  Since the
treaty was concluded in four official languages,9 the meaning of
the term "affect" has been the subject of some dispute. The French
version uses the term "affecter" which implies that the agreement
need only have some effect upon trade between the member states."'
The German, Italian, and Dutch versions use terms which appear
to require some harmful effect."0 The dispute therefore centered
about the question of whether the phrase was merely a jurisdictional
requirement similar to that of "interstate commerce" in the law of
the United States or whether the phrase required an interpretation
of article 85(1) which would result in the prohibition of only those
agreements which actually reduced trade between the member
states.102
(1) The Advocates General.-Mr. Roemer, one of the Advo-
97 It is true that by definition either Y or the manufacturer possesses some degree
of price freedom. Therefore, should X begin to engage in intrabrand competition,
Y or the manufacturer may theoretically lower the price of the goods to the point
where it is no longer profitable for X to purchase the goods from parties located out-
side the contract territory. Suppose, however, that the price is not lowered to this
point and that X does provide some intrabrand competition. Suppose further, that
neither Y nor the manufacturer is obtaining an "exorbitant" profit. Y and the manu-
facturer would then be in a position to contend (as some of the parties in Etablisse-
ments Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046
(EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966), did contend, although perhaps for different reasons,
see text accompanying note 29 supra) that if their agreement (prohibiting the manu-
facturer from delivering directly to anyone but Y located within the contract territory)
is within the scope of the treaty articles governing competition, it is article 85 which
applies and not article 86. Since article 86 prohibits only the "abuse" of a dominant
position, since the parties have not lowered the price to the point where intrabrand
competition is impossible, and sire the parties are not enjoying exorbitant profits, no
violation of article 86 occurred.
Of course, this argument has become moot. As noted, the Court of Justice has
decided that article 85 and not article 86 applies to exclusive distributorship agree-
ments. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
9
sEEC Treaty art. 85(1), 1 CMR 5 2005 (1965).
9 9 The four official languages are French, German, Dutch, and Italian. EEC
Treaty art. 248, 2 CMR 5 5455 (1965).
10o Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH, 2
CMR 5 8003, at 7152 (EEC Ct. Justice 1962).
101 The Italian version uses "pregudicare." The German version uses "beeintrach-
ten." The Dutch version uses "ongunstig beinvloeder." See ibid. (conclusions of the
Advocate General).
1 02 See Schwartz, sura note 84, at 628.
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cates General, contended that the phrase was not simply a require-
ment that the agreements have some effects outside of national
boundaries." 8 Rather, the agreement must have some actual or
conceivable' adverse effect upon trade between member states."°5
For example, in considering whether an exclusive distributorship
agreement is liable to affect trade between those member states, it
is necessary to determine whether or not the manufacturer could
have effectively entered the market in any other manner. If it was
not possible for the manufacturer to have done so, then the exclu-
sive distributorship agreement, in that it increases trade across na-
tional boundaries, has a favorable effect upon trade between the
member states and consequently is not within the scope of article
85(1).1°6
Mr. Roemer's interpretation of "liable to affect trade between
the Member States" as requiring an "unfavorable" effect and the
Commission's interpretation of restriction, distortion, or prevention
of competition may lead to the same result by different routes.
Under Mr. Roemer's approach, an agreement is not within the
scope of this phrase unless it has an unfavorable effect on trade
between the member states. Therefore, if a manufacturer could not
effectively enter a market without an exclusive distributorship agree-
ment, as determined by an investigation into, for example, the
financial resources of the manufacturer and perhaps the consumer
acceptance of the product, that agreement possesses a favorable in-
fluence upon trade between the member states and is not within
the scope of article 85(1).
In order to determine whether a restriction of competition is
prohibited by article 85(1), the Commission has indicated that the
restriction must be "perceptible," i.e., effective.' A determination
of "perceptibility" seemingly would not require an investigation into
such facts as, for example, the financial resources of the manufac-
108 Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the EEC 2 CMR
5 8048, at 7729 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
104 Ibid. Mr. Roemer used the term "conceivable" to mean "if not purely hypo-
thetically at least as a reasonably predictable result." Ibid. See also Etablissements
Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC 2 CMR 5 8046, at
7666 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
105 Id. at 7664; Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the
EEC, 2 CMR 5 8048, at 7729 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966); Soci&d6 Technique
Mini~re v. Machinenbau Uum GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8047, at 7701 (EEC Ct. Justice June
30, 1966).
106 Id. at 7702-03; Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Com-
mission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7664-65 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
107 Id. at 7640.
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turer. An exclusive distributorship agreement does not result in a
"perceptible" restriction if no parallel imports would have occurred
in the absence of the agreement or if no prospective parallel im-
porter has complained to the Commission about the agreement. If
parallel imports would not have occurred or if no parallel importer
has complained, there would seem to be no present demand in the
contract territory for the product of the manufacturer. It would
therefore be unlikely that the manufacturer could have entered the
market without the exclusive distributorship agreement, unless, of
course, the manufacturer possessed the financial resources required
for vertical integration or internal expansion.
Thus, both Mr. Roemer's approach to "liable to affect trade be-
tween the Member States" and the Commission's view on "percep-
tible" restriction of competition may prevent an agreement from
coming within the scope of article 85 (1) when that agreement
represents the only manner in which a manufacturer may enter a
market. There is one significant difference between the two ap-
proaches, however. Under Mr. Roemer's thesis, this type of agree-
ment under these circumstances would not be subject to Community
jurisdiction. Under the approach of the Commission, however,
this type of agreement may very well be subject to Community juris-
diction but would not be prohibited by article 85 (1) because it did
not perceptibly restrict, distort, or prevent competition.
(2) The Commission.-The Commission took the position
that "liable to affect trade between the Member States" will be
important primarily as a jurisdictional criterion separating Com-
munity jurisdiction from the jurisdiction of the individual member
states.' Thus, -the Commission has interpreted article 85(1) to
apply to any restriction of competition which caused "trade between
Member States to develop under conditions other than it would
have without such a restriction... [with the proviso that the agree-
ment'sl influence on market conditions be of some significance."' 9
The Commission indicated that "trade between Member States
. . . [developsi under conditions other than it would have with-
108 Id. at 7643-44.
109 Decision of the Comm'n on Grundig-Consten Agreement, 1 CMR 5 2743, at
1864 (EEC Comm'n 1962). For similar language see Decision of the Comm'n on
D.R.U.-Blondel Agreement. 2 CMR 5 9049, at 8099 (EEC Comm'n 1965); Decision
of the Comm'n on Hummel-Isbecque Agreement 2 CMR 5 9063, at 8138 (EEC Comm'n
1965); Decision of the Comm'n on Jallatte Agreements, 2 CMR 5 9083, at 8174 (EEC
Comm'n 1965).
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out '"" an agreement if that agreement causes trade to be "deflected
from its normal and natural course ... [and if the deflection is]
of some importance.""' As the term "normal" is not clarified fur-
ther, it is necessary to resort to a specific application of the inter-
pretation of the Commission in order to clarify this term in a man-
ner which does not obliterate the distinction between "liable to
affect trade between Member States" and "restrict, distort, or pre-
vent competition."
In Decision of the Comm'n on Grundig-Consten Agreement,12
the Commission indicated that due to the fact that the agreement
prohibited the German manufacturer (Grundig) from delivering
directly to anyone but the exclusive distributor (Consten) located
within the contract territory (France, the Saar, and Corsica), French
enterprises other than Consten were prevented from importing
Grundig products into France."' Similarly, the reexport prohibition
imposed by Grundig upon its exclusive dealers including Consten,
impeded, if not prevented, the integration of the national markets
into one common market. 'This effect ... [was] demonstrated
clearly by the difference in prices [for Grundig products] in various
Member States . . . .""' Consequently, the Commission decided
that the agreements affected trade between the member states." 5
It would thus appear that the term "normal" should be under-
stood as a reference to the logical consequences of the integration
of the six national markets into one common market. For example,
as trade barriers erected by the individual member states are re-
moved, theoretically manufacturers will distribute their goods in
many different member states as distributors in those states find it
profitable to purchase goods from manufacturers located in other
states. Theoretically, manufacturers will sell their goods to any
distributor desiring them, whether a particular distributor is located
in France, Germany, or any other member state. Thus, the signifi-
cance of national boundaries will decrease. If a manufacturer
grants an exclusive distributorship, he will refuse to deliver directly
to anyone located in the contract territory other than the exclusive
110 Dedsion of the Comm'n on Grundig-Consten Agreement, supra note 109, at
1864.
311 Socid&6 Technique Mini~re v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8047, at
7689 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966). (Emphasis added.)
112 1 CMR 5 2743 (EEC Comm'n 1962).
113 Id. at 1864.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
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distributor. National boundaries are replaced by the boundaries of
the contract territory; pursuant to an exclusive distributorship con-
tract, trade is deflected from its "normal" course."'
The Commission was of the opinion that an agreement is liable
to affect trade between the member states if the "trade between
Member States... [develops] under conditions other than it would
have without""' 7 the agreement and if the agreement's influence is
of some "significance" or "importance."" 8 Although the Commis-
sion has indicated that the terms "significant" and "important"
should not be understood as requiring a quantitative test," 9 the terms
have not been otherwise specifically darified with respect to exclu-
sive distributorship agreements. In Grundig-Consten, the Commis-
sion indicated that the fact that the agreement impeded the integra-
tion of the six national markets was demonstrated by the existence
of a great difference between the French and German price for
identical Grundig products.2 It is possible, therefore, that the
Commission considers that an exclusive distributorship agreement
possesses an "important" or "significant" effect upon trade between
the member states if the agreement has caused or is likely to cause
prices for the same goods to differ greatly in the different member
states, i.e., has or is likely to have the effect of maintaining the
price differences that existed prior to the abolition of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions.
The Commission's interpretation of "liable to affect trade be-
tween the Member States" subjects any agreement which results
in replacing national trade barriers with private trade barriers to
the jurisdiction of the Community. This interpretation is similar
but not identical to the Commission's interpretation of "prevention,
"1 The Commission is thus of the opinion that an exclusive distributorship agree-
ment is within the jurisdiction of the Community even if trade between the member
states is increased due to the existence of the agreement. The sole purpose of the
treaty, according to the Commission, is not to increase trade between the member
states. If this were the sole purpose of the treaty, that instrument would contain no
provisions for prohibiting state aids to business or for mitigating the effects of dumping.
Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2
CMR 5J 8046, at 7643 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966). See also Soci&L-Technique
Minire v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8047, at 7689 (EEC Ct, Justice
June 30, 1966).
11 Decision of the Comm'n on Grundig-Consten Agreement, 1 CMR 5 2743, at
1864 (EEC Comm'n 1965).
118 See text accompanying note 111 supra.
119 See Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the
EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7644 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
1 20 Decision of the Comm'a on Grundig-Consten Agreement, 1 CMR 5 2743, at
1862 (EEC Comm'n 1962).
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restriction, or distortion of competition." For example, the Com-
mission does not consider an exclusive distributorship agreement
between a French manufacturer and a French distributor to be sub-
ject to the treaty rules concerning competition,' 12 that is, it is not
liable to affect trade between the member states. However, this
agreement will have the effect of restricting intrabrand competition
within the contract territory. Therefore, if the agreement had been
liable to affect trade between the member states, the agreement
would have been prohibited by article 85 (1) under the Commission's
interpretation of "restriction, distortion, or prevention of competi-
tion" providing, of course, that the restriction was "perceptible." 12
(3) The Court of Justice.-The Court of Justice agreed with
the Commission that the phrase "liable to affect trade between the
Member States" was important as a jurisdictional criterion separating
the jurisdictional authority of the Community from that of the in-
dividual member states.12  Thus, in order for the validity of an
agreement to be governed by the treaty, the agreement "must, on
the basis of all the objective elements of law or of fact taken to-
gether, indicate that there is a sufficient degree of probability that
it may have some influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential,
on the flow of trade between Member States."'1
If this statement were viewed alone, the effect of the decision
would be to expand the Community's jurisdiction to cover a number
of agreements that would not be covered under the interpretation
of the Commission. This results from the fact that under the above
interpretation, any agreement between parties, each of whom is lo-
cated in a different member state, would be "liable to affect trade
between the Member States."
However, the statement of the court noted above should not be
considered apart from the context within which it appears. The
121 This is indicated, for example, by the Proposed Group Exemption art. 1 (a), 2
CMR 9 9125, at 8274 (Aug. 26, 1966). An agreement may not be exempted pursuant
to article 85(3) unless it is first established that the agreement is prohibited by article
85(1). Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Comm'n of the EEC, 2
CMR 9 8048, at 7718 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966). The proposed group exemp-
tion applies only to bilateral agreements concluded between parties, each of which is
located in a different member state or between parties one of whom is located within
the Common Market and one of whom is located without that territory. Proposed
Group Exemption art. l(a) supra, at 8274.
122 See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
12 Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC,
2 CMR 9 8046, at 7652 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966); Socit6 Technique Mini~re
v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR 9 8047, at 7696 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966).
124 Id. at 7696.
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statement occurs in the opinion of the court in a case considering
exclusive distributorship agreements. In the next sentence the court
states:
[T'hat is why, in order to determine whether a clause "granting
an exclusive selling righe' falls within the field of application ofArticle 85, it is necessary to know whether it is capable of parti-
tioning the market in certain products between Member States
and of thus rendering the economic interpretation sought by the
Treaty more difficult.3 5
Thus the general statement of the court quoted previously should
be confined, in all probability, to facts before the court. With
respect .to exclusive distributorship agreements at least, the proper
view of the court's interpretation of "liable to affect trade between
the Member States" should be that the agreement exhibits such an
effect if it represents an impediment to the integration of the six
national markets. An analysis of the purposes of the Treaty of
Rome supports the view of the court that an agreement is within
the jurisdiction of the Community if it can be viewed as an impedi-
ment to the integration of those markets.
One reason why states impose quantitative restrictions and tariffs
upon imported goods is to protect their industries from the compe-
tition of foreign industries. 2 The protection of domestic industries
can be beneficial if, for example, the state desires to shelter an infant
industry from competition until it is strong enough to compete on
the same basis with stronger foreign firms already established in
that industry, or if the state desires to encourage its citizens to invest
their capital in a particular industry. More often than not, how-
ever, tariffs and quantitative restrictions are harmful in that the
protection of domestic industries from the competition of more effi-
cient foreign firms insulates the domestic industries from the pres-
sure to innovate and lower costs. Therefore, one objective of the
Treaty of Rome seemingly was to remove the obstacles to comped-
tion between industries located in the individual member states
resulting from state action. Domestic industries, unprotected by
tariffs and quantitative restrictions, would thus be subjected to
greater pressure to innovate.'27
125 Ibid. See also Government of the Republic of Italy v. Council & Conm'n of
the EEC, 2 CMR g 8048, at 7719 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966); Etablissements
Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR g 8046, at
7652 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
126 Other reasons may be fiscal in nature.
127 Of course, the removal of trade barriers has other advantages as well. For
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If the barriers to free trade erected by state action are to be
removed and if the objective noted above is to be realized, the re-
placement of the barriers erected by state action with barriers erected
by private action must not be permitted. To this end, one objective
of the treaty articles concerned with competition is to supplement
the other articles of the treaty by serving to prevent private action
from restricting the free movement of goods between the member
states.
In light of this purpose, the court is undoubtedly correct in
holding that, at least,128 agreements which impede the integration
of the six national markets should be within the jurisdiction of the
Community. The court is also correct, as this is a question of juris-
diction and not of legality, in its view that if the agreement is an
impediment to integration, the fact that the agreement also increases
trade between the member states is immaterial.
129
It should be noted that the interpretation of the court does not
require, as does the interpretation of the Commission, that the
agreement represent a perceptible impediment which is of some
importance.' Under the court's interpretation, therefore, it would
appear that an exclusive distributorship agreement is "liable to affect
trade between the Member States" and is thus within .the jurisdiction
of the Community even if the manufacturer could not have effec-
tively entered the market in any other manner (as demonstrated
either by an investigation into the manufacturer's financial resources
or by the existence of attempted parallel imports). However, this
does not mean that an exclusive distributorship agreement is pro-
hibited pursuant to article 85(1) if the manufacturer could not have
effectively entered the market in any other manner. Under the
interpretation of "prevent, restrict, or distort competition" adopted
example, the removal of the barriers creates a larger market which may enable the
domestic industries to take advantage of economies of scale.
128 It is submitted that the court did not hold that only those agreements which
impede the integration of the six national markets are within the jurisdiction of the
Community. This question, it is submitted, was left open by the court. This is indi-
cated by the use of the introductory words "it is necessary to know" (not suffident to
know) in Sod&6 Technique Mini~re v. Mahinenbau Ulm GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8047,
at 7696 (EEC Ct. Justice June 30, 1966) and, particularly, by the use of the introduc-
tory words "it is important to know" (not sufficient to know) in Etablissements Con-
sten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7652
(EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966). It may be, however, that this will be the interpretation
ultimately adopted by the court.
129 Id. at 7652.
130 Ibid.
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by the court,'81 it is probable that an exclusive distributorship
agreement in these circumstances would not be prohibited by ari-
cle 85(1).
It should also be noted that according to the court's construction of
"liable to affect trade between the Member States" it is possible
that an agreement between two enterprises located within the same
member state may be subject to Community jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, if two French enterprises in competition with each other agree
that one of the enterprises shall export its products only to Germany
and the Netherlands and the other enterprise agrees that it shall
export its products only to the Benelux countries, the agreement
has the effect of replacing national trade barriers with barriers
erected by private agreement. It appears doubtful, however, that
at the present time the Commission would exercise this jurisdictional
authority even if it could be said to possess jurisdiction over this
type of agreement.38 2
Ill. CONCLUSION
A major portion of the Commission's efforts in applying article
85 have been devoted to the consideration of exclusive agreements.
Moreover, all of the decisions of the Court of Justice involving
article 85 have concerned, either directly or indirectly, this type of
agreement. 3 In light of the foregoing analysis of these efforts
and decisions, some tentative conclusions concerning the interpreta-
tion of article 85(1) and the particular application of this article
to exclusive dealing agreements may be noted.
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits all agreements
between enterprises which are liable to affect trade between the
member states and "which are designed to prevent, restrict, or dis-
tort competition within the Common Market or which have this
effect."'34  Article 85(2) provides that all agreements which come
181 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
13 2 See EEC Council Reg. 17, art. 5, 1 CMR 5 2441 (1965). Notification is
required only for agreements between enterprises located in different member states.
See also Proposed Group Exemption art. 1, 2 CME 5 9125, at 8274 (Aug. 26, 1966)
which applies solely to agreements between enterprises located in different member
states.
133 Government of the Republic of Italy v. Coundil & Comm'n of the EEC, 2 CMR
5 8048 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966); Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966);
Soci&t6 Technique Mni&e v. Machinenbau Ulm GmnbH, 2 CMR § 8047 (EEC Ct.
Justice June 30, 1966); Kleding-Verkoopbedrdif de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert
Bosch GmbH, 2 CMR 5 8003 (EEC Ct Justice 1962).
18 4EEC Treaty art. 88, 1 CMR 5 2251 (1965).
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within the scope of article 85(1) and which cannot be exempted
by article 85(3) are "automatically" null and void.
If an agreement is liable to affect trade between the member
states, it is within the jurisdictional authority of the Community
and thus must be examined to determine whether it is intended to
prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market
or whether it has this effect. The Treaty of Rome has as its prime
objective the integration of the six national markets of the member
states into one common market. This objective is to be accom-
plished not only by the elimination of tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions but also by the prevention of agreements which would
replace these impediments resulting from state action with other
impediments resulting from the operation of private agreements.
In accord with this interpretation of the role of article 85 in the
integration process, a horizontal or vertical agreement is "liable to
affect trade between the Member States" within the meaning of
article 85(1) if the agreement can be viewed as threatening the
achievement of the objectives of the treaty. 5'
Accordingly, an exclusive dealing contract between a manufac-
turer located in one member state and its wholly owned, indepen-
dently managed subsidiary located in another member state or be-
tween a manufacturer located in one member state and an indepen-
dent dealer located in another member state can be considered as
subject to the jurisdictional authority of the Community. "' An
exclusive dealing contract prevents the manufacturer from delivering
directly to anyone other than the exclusive dealer located within
the contract territory. Therefore, an exclusive dealing contract can
be viewed as an attempt to erect trade barriers by private agreement
and therefore liable to affect trade between the member states,
within the meaning of article 85(1).
An agreement may be said .to prevent, restrict, or distort com-
petition if, the effects of the agreement or even the mere agreement
itself in light of the economic context within which it is to be im-
plemented, is such that the agreement can be viewed as intending or
effectuating the elimination, restriction, or distortion of the com-
petitive rivalry between firms located within the Common Market
which would occur absent the agreement."'
An exclusive dealing agreement between parties located in dif-
135 See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
186 See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
137 See text accompanying notes 38-50 supra.
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ferent member states may theoretically be considered to prevent,
restrict, or distort competition. Pursuant to an exclusive dealing
contract, a manufacturer agrees not to deliver directly to third parties
located within the contract territory. These third parties (parallel
importers), if they desire to compete with the exclusive dealer for
the sale of the manufacturer's product to the consumer, must pur-
chase the goods indirectly from parties located without the contract
territory. The costs incurred by these parallel importers will always
be greater than the costs incurred by the exclusive dealer who pur-
chases the goods directly from the manufacturer. The parallel im-
porters will theoretically be unable to sell the goods at a price
which is less than the price at which the goods are sold by the
exclusive dealer and still generate a profit (unless, of course, the
parallel importer is considerably more efficient than the exclusive
dealer). Thus, an exclusive agreement may theoretically impair
intrabrand competition.138
However, a theoretical restriction or prevention of intrabrand
competition is apparently not sufficient to cause the agreement to
be prohibited by article 85 (1). ' A determination of the intent
of the parties, as indicated by an analysis of the terms of the agree-
ment in light of the economic context in which it is to be imple-
mented, must reveal a "sufficient" degree of injury to competition.
If an analysis of the agreement itself does not reveal a "sufficient"
degree of injury to competition, the agreement will not be prohib-
ited by article 85 (1) unless the agreement actually results in a pre-
vention or "perceptible" restriction of competition. 4 '
It would thus appear that exclusive dealing agreements are
not per se violations of article 85 (1). For example, if the manu-
facturer possesses a relatively small position on the market or if
the manufacturer's product is relatively new, it may be determined
that parallel imports would not have occurred in the absence of
the agreement. It would therefore appear, in light of the agree-
ment's projected economic impact, that it is not intended to restrict
competition. Moreover, if parallel imports would not have occurred
in the absence of the agreement, then the agreement cannot be
said to prevent competition between the parallel importer and the
exclusive dealer. Finally, if parallel imports would not have oc-
curred in the absence of the agreement, third parties will not, pre-
138 See text accompanying notes 52-64 supra.
139 See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
140 See text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
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sumably, complain about the agreement, and the parties should not
find it necessary to institute legal proceedings to prevent parallel
imports. The agreement would thus appear not to "perceptibly"
restrict competition. Therefore, it would seem that in these cir-
cumstances, the agreement would not be prohibited by article 85(1).
In light of the purpose of the rules governing competition con-
tained in the Treaty of Rome, it is clear that the court was correct
in holding that article 85(1) of the treaty applies to vertical agree-
ments as well as to horizontal agreements. The court was also
correct, in light of this purpose and in light of the express wording
of article 85(1), in holding that article 85 and not article 86 applies
to exclusive dealing agreements. However, due to .the less stringent
requirements of article 86, the court's decision on this point may
stimulate a number of vertical integrations.
The court's interpretation of the jurisdictional clause contained
in article 85 (1) ("liable to affect trade between the Member States"),
in light of the type of agreement before the court, is also correct.
If the objectives of the treaty are to be achieved, private agreements
which impede the achievement of these objectives must be pre-
vented.141 Because the Community institutions were specifically
created in order to facilitate the realization of the treaty objectives,
it is desirable that the Community be granted the most extensive
jurisdictional authority with respect to private agreements which
threaten the achievement of Community goals as is consistent with
the treaty's delicate division of authority between the Community
and the individual member states.
The court's incorporation of a "rule of reason" into its inter-
pretation of article 85(1)142 may be subject to criticism. It may
be true that, from the point of view of competitive theory, an
exclusive dealing agreement under certain circumstances may repre-
sent the only manner in which the manufacturer may enter a new
market and may thus be beneficial to competition. However, it
would appear that if an exclusive agreement is to be permitted
under these circumstances, the appropriate means of granting per-
mission would be by virtue of article 85 (3) which, as the court
itself noted, is to be applied separately and apart from article 85(1).
The incorporation of a "rule of reason" into article 85(1) may
14 1 In light of these purposes, the Commission's hostility to agreements prohibiting
parallel imports and reexports, see Decision of the Comm'n on Grundig-Consten Agree-
ment, 1 CMR 5 2743 (EEC Comm'n 1962); Proposed Group Exemption arts. 2(5),
2(6), 2 CMR 5 9125, at 8275 (Aug. 26, 1966), which is undoubtedly correct.
142 See text accompanying notes 38-50 supra.
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perhaps be explained in an attempt to maintain a balance in the
division of authority between the Community and the judiciary of
the individual member states. However, the flexibility now pos-
sessed by the national courts in their application of article 85(1)
may jeopardize the accomplishment of the treaty's goals and may
open the door to many varying interpretations of article 85(1).
Moreover, this flexibility and the possible consequent variance in
interpretation may encourage individuals to shun the difficulties
involved in notifying the Commission of their agreements.
Just as the European Economic Community represented a new
international phenomenon, so the rules of competition contained in
the Treaty of Rome represented a relatively new phenomenon in
Western Europe. Because the experience of the American judiciary
in interpreting the antitrust laws of the United States was not
entirely apposite to the interpretation of the Treaty of Rome,14 the
Commission and the court were in the position of beginning anew
in their attempt to interpret article 85 as it applies to exclusive
dealing agreements. It must therefore be admitted that although
the decisions of the court and those of the Commission are not
entirely satisfactory, they certainly represent a significant contribu-
tion to the attempt to fuse the six formerly independent national
markets into one common market.
143 The historical background, general structure, and approach of the American
antitrust laws are significantly different from the background, structure, and approach
of the Community rules governing competition. See generally De Keyser, Territorial
Restrictions and Export Prohibitions Under the United States and the Common Market
Antitrust Laws, 2 COMMON MARKET L REV. 271, 294-96 (1964).
Note, however, the reference of M fr. Roemer to White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253 (1963) in Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Com-
mission of the EEC, 2 CMR 5 8046, at 7662 (EEC Ct. Justice July 13, 1966).
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